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ABSTRACT

The literature has mainly focused on examining information security behavior at the individual level. However, information
security practice incorporates structural elements and as such may be explored as a social practice. In a preliminary step, we
briefly review theories of social practice and explore information security as a social practice. We derive three propositions
related to (1) the three elements of materials, competences, and meanings, (2) the relation of information security with other
practices, and (3) the necessity of retaining practice “hosts.” We briefly discuss the potential implications of this work.
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INTRODUCTION

Cyber threats have proven to constitute a serious challenge to societies, organizations, and individuals. While technical security
solutions have been developed to counter these threats in different domain applications, they have been limited in their capacity
to stay ahead of cybercriminals who prey upon individuals’ maladaptive security behaviors and actions. End-users remain the
weakest link in the information security chain, and human actions introduce significant vulnerabilities to the workplace.
The human factor in cybersecurity has drawn IS researchers’ attention in recent years (e.g., Nehme and George, 2020;
Warkentin, Walden, Johnston, & Straub, 2016; Warkentin and Willison, 2009). Extant studies have examined the factors that
affect individuals’ (mal)adaptive security behaviors in individual and organization contexts by using different behavioral
theories (e.g., Nehme and George 2018). Example theories include but are not limited to Protection Motivation Theory (PMT;
Rogers 1975), Deterrence Theory (DT; Gibbs 1975), and Neutralization Theory (NT; Sykes and Matza 1957). The application
of these theories in the information security context has indeed enhanced our understanding as to what motivates home and
organizational users to take security precautions and comply with information security policies, respectively. Nonetheless, our
understanding remains limited to the individual level as these theories (and the information security empirical studies that
employ them) take ‘individuals’ (i.e., the user) as the unit of analysis, whereas cybersecurity incorporates social structural
elements. Social interactions, whether explicit or implicit, embody security dimensions that transcend individual phenomena
and encompass data sharing (Menard et al. 2014), online process sharing (Trinkle et al. 2014), and financial exchanges (Lee et
al. 2004).
Consider Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) cyberattacks that exploit IoT (connected) consumer devices and employ them
in botnets to carry out malicious activities (e.g., disrupt Internet platforms and websites, disseminate malware, etc.). For such
attacks to take place, they require a set of different security vulnerabilities to exist across space and time. These vulnerabilities
may include user behavioral deficiencies (e.g., when users do not take the necessary security precautions to protect their devices
from being hacked), technical and design vulnerabilities, and control vulnerabilities (e.g., the lack of regulatory policies). Here,
the interrelatedness of these different structural elements allows the cyberattack to take place. This warrants examining
information security at a social level, and not only at the individual-level. To that end, we turn to social practice theories, which
unlike the theories used in the extant information security literature (i.e., PMT, DT, NT, etc.) take social structure into account
and take entities as the unit of analysis, as opposed to individuals.
The present paper is an emergent research work (or a work in process). We first provide a brief overview of social practice
theories. Then, we analyze information security as a social practice and derive several propositions. We conclude with a brief
discussion of this work’s potential implications and contributions.
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THEORIES OF SOCIAL PRACTICE

Social practice theories have been examined across different disciplines and streams of research, such as energy consumption,
transport, and linguistics. Most relevant to this paper is the use of these theories in Information Systems (for a comprehensive
review, see Jones and Karsten, 2008). Traditionally, theories of social practice in IS have mainly concentered around the ‘sociomaterial’ role of the technology in organizations (e.g., Kellogg, Orlikowski, and Yates, 2006; Orlikowski, 2000; Orlikowski
and Scott, 2008; Suchman, Blomberg, Orr, and Trigg, 1999). Recently, however, IS research has examined non-organizational
IT practices and information public goods, such as open source development, from a social practice theoretical lens (e.g., von
Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth, and Wallin, 2012). Also, very recent research in the information security context has begun to
consider social practice theory (e.g., Andersson, Hedstrom, and Karlsson, forthcoming). Along the same course, this paper
considers the outcome of information security, which like open source software is essentially a public/social good, as a process
that reflects social practice.
Theories of social practice manifest an effort toward resolving the structure-agency dualism in social systems, and as such
promote social order and change (Bourdieu 1990; Giddens 1984). One such theory, the theory of structuration, describes social
systems as systems exhibiting structural properties, as opposed to having embedded structures (Giddens 1984). Structuration
considers structure and agency to be “co-constitutive” (Brock, Carrigan, and Scambler, 2016), to consist of a set of social
practices executed by “knowledgeable human agents,” and as such to establish the “structural properties” of societies (Giddens
1984, 1991). Central to structuration is the instantiation of practice by actions (i.e., “doing” or “performance”). Bourdieu’s
thesis of practice also accentuates actions (Schatzki 1997). The framework considers social practice as a function of habitus
(i.e., a system of permanent dispositions, schemata, perceptions, conceptions, and actions) and field (i.e., a structure or hierarchy
of social positions), wherein both are inter-related. This inter-relation is generated and governed by the following process: (1)
conditions in the field generate dispositions, (2) dispositions produce activities and (3) “interwoven activities” form practices
executed in the field. Both theories (i.e., Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s) consider that practices are perpetual (i.e., have “space-time
extension”) and that a structure is the “medium and result” of practices (Schatzki 1997). Despite the theories’ dominance in
social practice research, they have been criticized for their limitations.
The limitations of the theory of structuration include: (1) its lack of temporality, which arguably renders it unsuccessful in
explaining or inducing social change (Archer 1996, 1982), (2) its limited scope of empirical application (Archer 1982; Schatzki
1997), and (3) its sensitivity to the assumption that human agents have the required knowledge and power to carry out social
practice (Adams 2006). Similarly, the theoretical account of field and habitus is limited in that it overemphasizes individuals’
attributes (i.e., habitus). Additionally, both theories are criticized for ignoring the role of non-human agents (i.e., materials),
such as technologies (Reckwitz 2002a). Given these limitations, extensions of Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s theoretical accounts
have emerged with a unique focus on analyzing practice as an entity, as opposed to an individual’s outcome of knowledge and
habitus.
Contemporary theories of social practice address those limitations through describing practice as an entity of interrelated
elements (Reckwitz 2002b; Shove et al. 2012). These elements include the following: (1) materials, (2) meanings, and (3)
competences (Shove et al. 2012). Materials refer to the objects, tools, goods, and infrastructure involved in a practice. Meanings
refer to shared social understandings of a practice, its societal significance, and its outcome experiences. Competences refer to
skills, practical know-how, and understandings of performance (i.e., performing the practice). Fundamental to this view of
social practice is the distinction between performance and entity. Performance represents momentary observable behavior,
whereas the three entity elements underpin the performance. Through identifying those underpinnings, recent theories have
facilitated the empirical study and prediction of practice and social change (Shove et al. 2012; Warde 2005).
In addition to identifying the three elements of social practice, contemporary theories highlight the interdependency
characteristics of practices, through which they interact (Schatzki 2002). Interdependent practices form “bundles” (i.e., complex
systems) that underlie the spatiotemporal aspect of social change. On that basis, relations within bundles harmonize or conflict,
and as such bundles co-evolve (Schatzki 2002). Thereby, “trajectories” of practices affect each other and impact people’s
everyday life. In turn, people also affect these trajectories. In that sense, practices’ survival depends on the recruitment and
retention of human actors, who in turn reshape them (Shove et al. 2012). This implies that a practice may only survive by its
“carriers,” or “hosts,” also referred to as “practitioners” (Reckwitz 2002b).
INFORMATION SECURITY AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE

Information security has drawn the attention of researchers, industry players, and government agencies, each of whom have
influenced society in one form or another. Recently however, information security has increasingly been recognized as an
integral part of society. It is important to note that information security is not only an end in itself, but rather it is practiced for
attaining safer computing. Thereby, the practice of information security lies within a broader social practice, which is social
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computing. In that sense, information security practice is not a cause or effect of social systems but a prominent component of
social computing.
As previously discussed, social practices do not only involve human agents but also incorporate what is termed the “missing
masses” of artifacts, devices, and infrastructures (Latour 1992; also referred to as “material arrangements,” Schatzki 2010).
Information security practice comprises the following materials among others: secure infrastructures, secure devices, and secure
software/applications. The set of materials involved differ with each of the different structural components mentioned in the
introduction (i.e., behavioral (user), technical (design), and control). Competences in the practice of information security
involve the skills and knowledge of securing information artifacts at the control, design, and use levels. For instance, users’
competences include (but are not limited to) knowing how to update their mobile applications and changing default device
credentials. Meanings complement competences by integrating the ‘know-why’ rather than the ‘know-how.’ They include
understanding why information security is essential in terms of protection against cybercrime and insider threats.
From a social practice theory perspective, information security is an entity of the three interrelated elements of materials,
competences and meanings. Thus, as a practice, it is only fulfilled if all elements are present. For instance, taking the necessary
behavioral measures to secure an information artifact (i.e., competence) would be insufficient in the absence of security patches
or a secure design that may conform to security standards (i.e., materials).
Proposition 1: The absence of any of the three elements (i.e., materials, competences, and meanings) disrupts information
security as a social practice.
From a social practice theory lens, a practice entity does not persist in separation of other practices. As a social practice,
information security is interconnected with other practices, such as adopting the technology at the use phase, innovating
(convenient) IT artifacts in the design phase, and releasing trade policies in the control phase. As such, information security
depends on other related social practices. These dependencies form a bundle that evolves and impact social order across time
and space. For instance, information security practice by home users would be negatively affected by a high level of suboptimal application security development, or adequate compliance by employees would be inadequate with an insufficient push
of software patches from the vendor, etc.
Proposition 2: As a social practice, information security belongs to a bundle of practices. The focus on its elements, comprising
materials, meanings, and competences, independent of its relations with other bundles of entities (i.e., social practices) is
insufficient.
The relationships within the bundle are generated and maintained by information security “practitioners” (i.e., people who
perform security practice). The survival of information security practice depends on its carriers (i.e., practitioners). By
substitution, its survival depends on its capacity for recruiting and retaining carriers. This capacity is a function of the preset
conditions and available resources that practitioners act by and use respectively (Reckwitz 2002b). In the information security
context, conditions may include policies, and resources may include users’ access to security knowledge and information.
Proposition 3: The provision of the necessary requisites (i.e., conditions and resources) enhances the capacity of information
security practice to recruit and retain practitioners (i.e., hosts, or carriers of the practice).
In sum, from a social practice theory lens, information security as a social practice engages social structure and agents. The
elements of information security practice include secure artifacts, platforms, and infrastructure (i.e., materials), information
security knowledge and skills (i.e., competences), and information security comprehension (i.e., meanings). The absence of
any of three elements puts the practice at risk. The entity, comprised of the three elements, does not exist independently. Rather,
it is a constituent of a larger network of social practices, such as policy development and technology design. The practice’s
survival depends on the retention of its practitioners. The process of retention is dependent on the provision of resources and
conditions that facilitate ‘hosting’ the practice. Therefore, as proposed by the contemporary theories of social practice
(Reckwitz 2002b; Shove et al. 2012), information security practice is a unit of analysis. Examining information security practice
as a unit of analysis complements other inquiries that focus on individuals as the unit of analysis.
CONCLUSION

In this work, we have taken into account the social structure incorporated into information security. On that basis, we have
deviated from looking at security at the individual (user) level with the individual as the unit of analysis. We have turned to
social practice theory and have derived several propositions about information security as a social practice. As this work
continues, it may have far-reaching research implications and contributions considering that it looks at a new dimension of
information security, whereas the literature is largely restricted to the individual level by which the behavioral component of
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information security is examined. A main potential implication we may reach is that users’ information security behavior is not
only an outcome of individual choice but also a function of social structure and change.
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